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a b s t r a c t
How should a seller price her goods in a market where each buyer prefers a single good
among his desired goods, and will buy the cheapest such good, as long as it is within
his budget? We provide efficient algorithms that compute near-optimal prices for this
problem, focusing on a commodity market, where the range of buyer budgets is small. We
also show that our LP rounding based technique easily extends to a different scenario, in
which the buyers want to buy all the desired goods, as long as they are within budget.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Pricing goods tomaximize revenue is a critical yet difficult task in almost anymarket.We study the case of amonopolistic
seller (only one seller in the market), a restricted scenario that is already quite challenging. One difficulty is to estimate the
demand curves (amount of demand at different prices), but even complete knowledge of the demand curves is sufficient
only in rather simple cases, e.g. if the monopolist sells only a single type of good, or if the different goods she sells cater to
different markets. In such cases, the revenue-maximizing prices can be determined for each good separately, directly from
that good’s demand curve.
But what if goods of different types are sold all in the same market? Now, the seller’s own goods could be competing
against each other for the attention of the same buyer. This is generally true of a seller whowants to tap intomultiple market
segments. For example, Dell sells many models of laptops with varying features catering to varying needs of its consumers
and it must price the different models carefully so that they do not eat into each other’s revenue. As an example on a smaller
scale, consider the pricing of movie shows. Different shows are priced differently (for example, matinee vs. evening shows)
to attract different audience sections. Again, the pricing is critical—a very cheap matinee show might eat into the evening
show revenue and decrease the overall revenue.
On the other hand,multiple goodsmight lead to higher prices by complementing each other. A very visible example is the
marketing of Apple’s iPod and various accessories. The strategy there is not to sell the iPod in isolation but to offer various
accessories. These accessories vary from items that are expensive (for example, a charger) to items that are inexpensive (for
example, songs from iTunes). Pricing for revenuemaximization becomes computationally complex precisely because of this
interaction between different goods. Indeed, Aggarwal, Feder, Motwani and Zhu [1] and also Guruswami, Hartline, Karlin,
Kempe, Kenyon andMcSherry [9] studied the computational aspects of these pricing problems, showing that in various such
settings, computing the optimal prices is NP-hard.
✩ A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA) Eilat, Israel,
October 11–12, 2007.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 800 382 5968.
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In one setting, referred to as unit-demand consumers in [9], each buyer wants to buy one good out of his desired set, as
follows: There arem buyers, each of whom has an arbitrary set of desirable goods and a spending budget. The (single) seller
knows the buyers’ types (i.e. desired set and budget) and needs to set a price for each of the n goods. Once prices are set,
every buyer buys the (single) cheapest good in his set, provided it is within his budget (breaking ties arbitrarily). Another
setting, referred to as single-minded consumers in [9], differs from the first setting in that now each buyer only wants to buy
his desired set as a bundle. That is, once prices are set, every buyer buys the entire set of his desired goods, provided its total
cost is within his budget (if not, he buys nothing). We will also refer to buyers as bidders throughout this paper.
Throughout, we shall assume that the desired set of every buyer has size at most k. As we shall soon see, even the case
of small k is nontrivial and interesting. In addition, we shall assume that the goods are available in unlimited supply, that is,
the seller can sell any number of copies of the item without paying any marginal cost of production.
Several results are known about computing prices that maximize revenue in these two settings. In [1], it is shown that
the problem ofmaximizing revenue in the unit-demand case is not only NP-hard, but APX-hard.3 For this problem, they also
give anO(logm)-approximation algorithm (which uses the best single price). In [9], similar results are shown independently,
and it is shown in addition that for the single-minded setting, maximizing revenue is APX-hard and that there is log(nm)-
approximation algorithm (which again uses the best single price). Demaine, Feige, Hajiaghayi, and Salavatipour [8] show
that the above results are more or less optimal in the general single-minded bidder problem—under some complexity
assumptions, there is a fixed δ > 0 such that the problem cannot be approximated to within a factor of logδ n. Balcan
and Blum [3] present a 4-approximation algorithm for single-minded bidders and k = 2. Their algorithm extends to larger
k, with O(k)-approximation. As was observed in [7], their arguments apply to the unit-demand case as well.
These results depict a rather grim landscape (at least computationally) for the problem of pricing to maximize revenue.
However, many real-life instances are more specialized, and thus, a more practice-oriented approach is to identify
restrictions, under which one can beat the aforementioned O(log n) factor, or better yet, obtain a very small constant-factor
approximation. In particular, every percent of improvement counts in practice, requiring us to improve one (small) constant
approximation factor to another.
We thus pay special attention to commoditized markets, 4 where the range of buyers budgets is restricted to a ‘‘small’’ set
B. In one such restriction,B = {1, C} is a doubleton, representing a bimodal market in which buyers are divided into poor
and rich. For example, buyers coming from different referringwebsites such as lastminutedeals.com and hotels.com
might have significantly different budgets for booking a hotel room. As another example, a touristmight bewilling to pay for
a Broadway show a significantly higher amount than a local. Anothermotivation for studying suchmarkets could be the low
descriptive complexity for the different buyers’ budget types, or equivalently a low communication complexity to identify
a buyer’s budget. In yet another restriction, B = [1, C] is a small interval, representing a market with little variation, say
within 50%, in the valuation of different buyers, and clearly there are numerous examples for such markets. Note that in
both cases, the buyers can be completely idiosyncratic regarding their desired goods, as only the budgets are restricted.
1.1. Results and techniques
Unit-demand setting. In Section 2, we consider inputs with B = {1, C} (i.e., bimodal markets) and k = 2 (i.e. a desired set
is a pair of goods). On the one hand, the APX-hardness results [1,9] mentioned above are actually shown for such restricted
instances (in fact, for C = 2). On the other hand, obtaining (2 − 1C )-approximation is rather easy — simply choose the best
single price (same for all goods) among {1, C}— obviously a very naive solution, but already better than the (more general)
4-approximation that can be derived from [3]. The challenge in this regime is to improve the approximation below 2, and
indeed we present an algorithm achieving factor 32 − 12C . Observe that even when C is not too large, this is a significant
improvement (e.g. for C = 2, from 1.5 to 1.25). This approach easily extends to larger k, in which case the approximation
we achieve is 2− 1k − k−1kC .
Our algorithms are based on randomized rounding of a linear programming (LP) relaxation, a powerful paradigm that is
often useful for discrete optimization (for example, see the survey of Srinivasan [15]).We ‘‘round’’ the prices suggested by the
LP to prices in the discrete (‘‘integral’’) set {1, C}. The rationale behind this rounding is that an optimal pricing may always
choose prices from the set {1, C}. However, it is interesting to note that the pricing problem does not require the prices
to be ‘‘discrete’’, and thus, the real reason behind our rounding procedure is the following: In contrast with a ‘‘standard’’
randomized rounding algorithm, where the probability (with which we round a variable upwards) depends linearly on the
corresponding LP variable, we use a probability that is polynomial in the LP variable. The only other nonlinear randomized LP
rounding algorithms that we are aware of are the approximation algorithm of Goemans and Williamson [12] for MAX SAT,
and that for finding the densest k-subgraph problem that is attributed to Goemans [11]. The crux is that at every optimal
basic feasible solution of our LP relaxation, all the prices are half integral [16, Chap. 14] (modulo a normalization factor),
and this fact greatly simplifies the choice of the polynomial—in fact, our rounding procedure raises the variables to a power.
Interestingly, the value of the power is a function of C .
3 An optimization problem is APX-hard if there exists a constant ρ > 1 such that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimum within factor ρ.
4 A commoditized market is one characterized by price-competition with little or no differentiation by brand.
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Table 1
Comparison of results: Unit-demand setting.
Budgets range: Unlimited {1, C} [1, C]
k = 2 Here – 32 − 12C 1+ ln C
Previous [3] 4 4 4
Hardness [1,9] APX-hard APX-hard APX-hard
General k Here – 2− 1k − k−1kC –
Previous [1,9] O(lnm) – –
Hardness [1,9] APX-hard APX-hard APX-hard
Table 2
Comparison of results: Single-minded setting.
Budget range: Unlimited {1}
k = 2 Here – 6+
√
2
5+√2 ≈ 1.15
Previous [3,13] 4 4/3
Hardness [9] APX-hard APX-hard
General k Here – –
Previous [9] log nm –
Hardness [8,9] logδ n APX-hard
From a technical viewpoint, the case of k = 2 is really a quadratically constrained discrete optimization problem. The
algorithmof [3] essentially avoids the quadratic constraints completely by eliminating a randomhalf of the variables (setting
goods prices to 0). Our LP-based approach linearizes the constraints, and thus does not decouple the two goods in each
desired set, and the difficult part is of course to bound the resulting profit loss.
We further show that our algorithm can be derandomized, and that its approximation matches the LP’s integrality gap,
and thus it is optimal with respect to this LP. In addition, we observe that in the case where budgets come from an interval
B = [1, C], a simple algorithm achieves (1 + ln C)-approximation by computing the best single price, and that this factor
matches the integrality gap of an LP relaxation that extends the LP mentioned above for the case {1, C}. We summarize our
results (along with previously known results) for the unit-demand setting in Table 1.
Single-minded setting. Recently, Khandekar, Könemann and Markakis [13] have studied the case of single-minded bidders
with desired sets of size at most 2, and the same budget for all the buyers, and gave a 4/3-approximation algorithm.
Subsequently (but using independently derived techniques), we found out that our LP rounding approach mentioned above
is easy to adapt to this setting as well, achieving 6+
√
2
5+√2 ≈ 1.15 approximation. In Section 3 we briefly present this algorithm,
and show a matching integrality gap. Again, this problem is known to be APX-hard because the results of [9] are actually
shown for such restricted instances. Further, our algorithm obtains much better approximation than a 3/2-approximation
achievable by choosing the best single price in the set {1/2, 1}, which was already better than the (more general) 4-
approximation of [3].We summarize our result, alongwith previously known results for the single-minded setting in Table 2.
Online pricing. Finally, we consider in Section 4 inputs with k = 2 (and no restriction on the budget). Using a variation of
the algorithm designed by Balcan and Blum [3], we design an algorithm that works even in an online setting, where goods
arrive sequentially (together with the bids of all the buyers interested in that good), and the seller has to determine the price
of a good immediately as it arrives. This model may correspond for instance to Comcast cable TV selling video on demand,
where new offerings are announced (with prices) on a regular basis. Our algorithm achieves 4-approximation, compared to
the best (offline) prices. We note that [3] also give an online pricing algorithm, but in their setting buyers arrive online, and
the prices (of a fixed set of goods) need to be updated.
Truthful mechanisms. We assume throughout the paper that the seller knows the budget of each bidder. We may also
be interested in settings where the seller does not know such information about the market. Balcan, Blum, Hartline and
Mansour [4] show that every approximation algorithm for revenue maximization can be converted into a truth-revealing
mechanism. They design a general technique that loses only an additional factor of 1 + ϵ in the approximation, if certain
technical conditions (like sufficiently many bidders) are satisfied. Similarly to [3], we note that this technique is applicable
in our setting, and thus converts our algorithms to truthful mechanisms, provided that the number of bidders is at least
(roughly) Cn/ϵ2.
1.2. Related work
The notion of revenue-maximizing pricing of goods in unlimited supply was introduced by Goldberg, Hartline, Karlin,
Saks and Wright [10]. In their setting, the goods were ‘‘independent’’ and hence the optimization problem was trivial, and
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they focused on designing truthful mechanisms to maximize revenue. There have been numerous followup work, and we
only mention here results that are directly related to our work.
Guruswami, Hartline, Karlin, Kempe, Kenyon and McSherry [9] considered the problem of revenue maximization in a
variety of settings, including both unit-demand and single-minded bidders, and also envy-free pricing of goods in limited
supply. As mentioned earlier, they showed logarithmic upper bounds and APX-hardness for both types of bidders. The
results for the unit-demand case were also obtained independently by Aggarwal, Feder, Motwani and Zhu [1]. For single-
minded bidders, a polylogarithmic hardness result, which complements the result above, was obtained by Demaine, Feige,
Hajiaghayi, and Salavatipour [8]. The problem of the single-minded bidder case, where the size of the demand sets was
upper bounded by k, was considered by Briest and Krysta [6] who gave an O(k2)-approximation for the problem, and was
improved by Blum and Balcan [3] to O(k). For the special case of k = 2, they obtain a 4-approximation algorithm [3].
Another paper that is less directly related but was also a starting point for our work is the work of Bansal, Cheng,
Cherniavsky, Rudra, Schieber and Sviridenko [5], which studies a problem of pricing over time, that was proposed in [9].
A special case of their problem gives another interpretation for the unit-demand setting: The seller is selling just one type
of good (in unlimited supply), and does so over a period of n days, and can set a different price on each day. Each of the m
buyers has a subset of size k of the n days, which represent the days on which he can purchase the item, and will choose to
buy a copy of the good at the cheapest price he sees over the k days. The seller’s aim is to maximize revenue.
1.3. Problem definitions
Our pricing problems involve one seller and m buyers. The seller has a collection V of n goods (also called items). Each
j ∈ V is a digital good, i.e., the seller has 0 marginal cost of production, or equivalently, the number of copies of j is at least
the number of buyersm. Once the seller sets the prices of the goods, each buyer will buy a collection of goods, based on his
own utility function. The seller’s problem is to determine a price pj of each good j ∈ V so as tomaximize revenue. Depending
on the utility functions of the buyers, we have the following variations of the pricing problem. The first variation is our main
focus, but we will also show how the techniques we develop also work for the second variation.
1. Unit-demand bidders:. We let UDk(B) denote the problem of item pricing for unit-demand bidders with sets of size at
most k, and bids from the setB, as follows. Buyer i has a budget of ui ∈ B and a subset Si of desirable goods, with |Si| ≤ k. He
is interested in buying exactly one good from Si, and given prices on the goods, he will buy the cheapest good in Si, provided
that its price is at most ui. For a price vector p = (p1, . . . , pm), let πi(p) be the revenue that the seller obtains from buyer i
if the prices are set to p. Thus
πi(p) =

min{pj : j ∈ Si} if min{pj : j ∈ Si} ≤ ui
0 otherwise.
Thus the seller’s problem is: Find p so as to maximize
∑n
i=1 πi(p). We are interested in the following special cases of this
problem, defined by different values of k andB: (1) UDk([1, C]) for C > 1; and (2) UDk({1, C}) for C > 1.
2. Single-minded bidders:. We let SMk(B) denote the problem of item pricing for single-minded bidders, who have sets of
size k and bids from the setB, as follows. Buyer i has a budget of ui ∈ B and a subset Si of V of desirable goods with |Si| ≤ k.
He is interested in buying all the goods in the set Si. For a price vector p, let πi be the revenue that the seller obtains from
buyer i, if the prices are set to p. Thus
πi(p) =
∑
j∈Si pj if
∑
j∈Si pj ≤ ui
0 otherwise.
Again, the seller’s problem is: Find p so as tomaximize
∑n
i=1 πi(p). Wewill showhowour techniques forUD2({1, C}) extend
to give an algorithm for the case SM2({1}). Note that when |B| = 1, then all budgets can be scaled to 1, and we may take
B = {1}without loss of generality.
The case of k = 2: Pricing on a graph
Following [3], for k = 2, UD2(B) becomes a problem of pricing the vertices of a graph, with the buyers’ desired sets
corresponding to the edges of the graph. This will be our main focus in demonstrating our techniques and analysis. We
study two settings of budget ranges:B = {1, C} andB = [1, C], for C > 1.
Given a graph G = (V , E) (possibly with self-loops and parallel edges), along with edge weights cij ∈ B for every edge
(i, j) ∈ E, the goal is to set prices pi on every vertex i so as to maximize the total revenue, where the revenue from an edge
(i, j) ∈ E is:
πij =

min(pi, pj) if min(pi, pj) ≤ cij
0 otherwise.
The case of SM2(B), studied in [3], is defined as a pricing problem on a graph analogously.
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max
−
(i,j)∈E
πij subject to:
∀(i, j) ∈ E, cij = C πij ≤ 1+ pi (1)
∀(i, j) ∈ E, cij = C πij ≤ 1+ pj (2)
∀(i, j) ∈ E, cij = 1 πij ≤ 1 (3)
∀(i, j) ∈ E, i ≠ j, cij = 1 πij ≤ 2− pi + pjC − 1 (4)
∀(i, i) ∈ E, cii = 1 πii ≤ 1− piC − 1 (5)
∀i ∈ V 0 ≤ pi ≤ C − 1 (6)
∀(i, j) ∈ E πij ≥ 0 (7)
Fig. 1. LP relaxation for the unit-demand setting.
1.4. LP terminology
We shall use standard LP terminology, with a slight abuse notation due to the fact that all our LPs are bounded. Recall that
a solution to an LP is called feasible if it satisfies all the constraints. A feasible solution is called an extreme point if it cannot be
written as the convex combination of two distinct feasible solutions. For every bounded LP, the optimum can be attained at
an extreme point, and furthermore such an optimum solution can be computed in polynomial time. In the sequel, we shall
freely exchange the notion of an extreme point with the (perhaps more common) notion of a basic feasible solution.
2. Unit-demand buyers in commoditized markets
In this section, we look at pricing for unit-demand bidders with restricted valuations. We start with valuations restricted
to the set {1, C} for some C > 1. In other words, we are interested in pricing schemes for the UDk({1, C})model. Our main
result is a pricing scheme that generates a revenue within a factor (2k−1)C−k+1kC of the optimal revenue ( Theorem 2.4). For
ease of exposition, we present the proofs for the k = 2 case.
Our pricing scheme rounds an LP relaxation for the problem. Theorem 2.2 shows that our rounding algorithm (for the
case k = 2) has an approximation factor of 3C−12C . We show in Section 2.4 that the integrality gap of our LP relaxation is at
least 3C−12C demonstrating that our rounding procedure is tight (optimal).
It is not difficult to verify that the LP in Fig. 1 is a relaxation for our pricing problem UD2({1, C}); note that pi ∈ [0, C−1]
and that the price set to vertex i is actually pi + 1.
2.1. On the optimal LP solutions
We first observe that an optimal basic feasible solution to the LP relaxation is half integral, in the sense that all the pi
variables are from the set {0, C−12 , C − 1}. Recall that the price of vertex i is actually pi + 1.
Proposition 2.1. Every optimal basic feasible solution to the LP in Fig. 1 is half integral. More precisely, if ({p∗i }i∈V , {π∗ij }(i,j)∈E) is
such a solution then p∗i ∈ {0, C−12 , C − 1} for all i.
Proof. Let ({p∗i }i∈V , {π∗ij }(i,j)∈E) be an optimal solution, and suppose that the p(·) are not half integral. Wewill show that such
an assignment is not an extreme point by exhibiting two feasible solutions (p−, π−) and (p+, π+) such that for all i ∈ V ,
p∗i = 12 (p−i + p+i ) and for every (i, j) ∈ E, π∗ij = 12 (π+ij + π−ij ).
In the sequel, we may use values given to {pi}i∈V to define, for each (i, j) ∈ E,
πij =

1+min(pi, pj) if cij = C
min

1, 2− pi+pjC−1

if i ≠ j and cij = 1
1− piC−1 if i = j and cij = 1.
(8)
Note that if 0 ≤ pi ≤ C − 1 for every i ∈ V then the resulting solution (p, π) is feasible. Furthermore, the above assignment
to πij maximizes the objective function. In particular, since (p∗, π∗) is an optimal solution, we may assume that {π∗ij } were
defined from {p∗i } according to (8).
We proceed to exhibit the two aforementioned solutions (p+, π+) and (p−, π−). In fact, we shall only define explicitly
p+ and p−; the corresponding π+ and π− are defined according to (8). Define the following two subsets of vertices:
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V+ = {i | C−12 < p∗i < C − 1} and V− = {i | 0 < pi < C−12 }. By the assumption that p∗ is not half integral, V− ∪ V+ ≠ ∅.
Let ϵ > 0 be a small enough number (to be defined later). We define the two related ‘‘price’’ assignments.
p+i =

p∗i + ϵ if i ∈ V+
p∗i − ϵ if i ∈ V−
p∗i otherwise
p−i =

p∗i − ϵ if i ∈ V+
p∗i + ϵ if i ∈ V−
p∗i otherwise.
We set ϵ = 14 min{ϵ1, ϵ2, ϵ3, ϵ4, C − 1}where:
ϵ1 =min{|p∗i − p∗j | : p∗i ≠ p∗j , (i, j) ∈ E and cij = C},
ϵ2 =min
1− p∗i + p∗jC − 1
 : p∗i + p∗j ≠ C − 1, (i, j) ∈ E, and cij = 1
ϵ3 =min{p∗i : i ∈ V−}
ϵ4 =min{C − 1− p∗i : i ∈ V+}.
First note that ϵ > 0, which implies that p+ ≠ p∗ and p− ≠ p∗. Further, by the choice of ϵ3, ϵ4 and the fact that
ϵ < min(ϵ3, ϵ4, (C − 1)/2), we have that for every i ∈ V , 0 ≤ p+i ≤ C − 1 and 0 ≤ p−i ≤ C − 1. As observed earlier, this
implies that (p+, π+) and (p−, π−) are feasible solutions to the LP.
Obviously, for all i ∈ V , p∗i = 12

p+i + p−i

. To complete the proof, we will show that for every (i, j) ∈ E,
π∗ij = (π+ij + π−ij )/2. (9)
Let E1 = {(i, j) ∈ E | i, j ∉ V+ ∪ V−}. Clearly, for (i, j) ∈ E1, we have π∗ij = π+ij = π−ij and hence (9) holds. It thus remains to
consider edges (i, j) ∈ E \ E1, i.e., edges with at least one endpoint in V+ ∪ V−.
First consider the case where i ≠ j and cij = C . In this case, π∗ij = 1 + min(p∗i , p∗j ), π+ij = 1 + min(p+i , p+j ) and
π−ij = 1+min(p−i , p−j ). If p∗i = p∗j (both equal to p∗, say), then π∗ij = 1+ p∗. Further, either both i, j ∈ V+ or both i, j ∈ V−.
In the former case, π+ij = 1+ p∗+ ϵ and π−ij = 1+ p∗− ϵ, while in the latter case π+ij = 1+ p∗− ϵ and π−ij = 1+ p∗+ ϵ. In
either case, (9) is satisfied. If p∗i ≠ p∗j , then by the definition of ϵ if p∗i (without loss of generality) is the minimum price for
(i, j), then so are p+i and p
−
i ; this is because by the choice of ϵ1 and the fact that ϵ ≤ ϵ1/4, we have p∗i + ϵ < p∗j − ϵ. Again
by the definitions of p+ and p−, (9) is satisfied.
Now consider the casewhere i ≠ j and cij = 1.We now consider three subcases. First if p∗i +p∗j < C−1, then as ϵ < ϵ2/2,
we have p+i + p+j < C − 1 and p−i + p−j < C − 1. Thus, we have π∗ij = π+ij = π−ij = 1, which implies that (9) is satisfied.
Second if p∗i + p∗j > C − 1, then again as ϵ < ϵ2/2, we have p+i + p+j > C − 1 and p−i + p−j > C − 1. This implies that
π∗ij = 2− (p∗i + p∗j )/(C − 1), π+ij = 2− (p+i + p+j )/(C − 1) and π−ij = 2− (p−i + p−j )/(C − 1), which implies (9). Finally, if
p∗i + p∗j = C − 1 then exactly one of p∗i , p∗j is in V− and the other is in V+, thus π∗ij = π+ij = π−ij , which implies (9).
If i = j, then πii depends linearly on pi. As p∗i = 12 (p+i + p−i ), in this case (9) is also satisfied. 
2.2. A rounding algorithm
Consider the following randomized algorithm, where τ > 0 is a parameter (to be chosen later).
Algorithm Algo(τ ):
1. Solve the LP in Fig. 1 and obtain an optimal basic feasible solution with prices variables {pi}i∈V .
2. For every i ∈ V , independently assign a price of C with probability  piC−1 τ and a price of 1 with probability
1−  piC−1 τ .
We now analyze the performance of the rounding algorithm above.
Theorem 2.2. For every C > 1, there is τ > 0 such that Algo(τ ) is a (3C−1)/(2C)-approximation for the pricing problemwith
unit-demand bidders, k = 2, and budgets from B = {1, C}. That is, the expected revenue of Algo(τ ) is at least 2C3C−1 fraction of
the optimum for UD2({1, C}).
Proof. Set τ = 12 log
 3C−1
C−1

. For notational convenience, we will denote Algo(τ ) by Algo. Let the optimal (extreme point)
solution of the LP assign prices p∗i to every vertex i and obtain a revenue of π
∗
ij from every edge (i, j). We will show that for
every edge (i, j) ∈ E, the expected revenue of Algo from that edge is at least 2C3C−1 ·π∗ij ; the theorem then follows by linearity
of expectation. For the rest of the proof, it will be convenient to define, for every i ∈ V , qi = p
∗
i
C−1 . By Proposition 2.1, we
have qi ∈ {0, 12 , 1}. The main idea is to analyze the different edge types and chose τ so as to balance the revenues obtained
in the different cases.
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Let us first consider the case when i ≠ j. We have two subcases.
Case 1a: cij = 1. In this caseπ∗ij ≤ min(1, 2−qi−qj), whileAlgo obtains an expected revenue of 0·(qτi qτj )+1·(1−qτi qτj ) =
1 − (qiqj)τ . When qi = qj = 1 then both the LP and Algo obtain a revenue of 0. When qi + qj = 32 then the ratio of the
revenue obtained by Algo to π∗ij (which is 1/2) is 2(1− 12τ ) > 1− 122τ .5 Finally, when qi + qj ≤ 1, then π∗ij = 1, while Algo
obtains the least revenue when qi = qj = 12 , which implies a ratio of at least 1− 122τ = 2C3C−1 in all the possibilities.
Case 1b: cij = C. In this case π∗ij ≤ 1+ (C − 1)min(qi, qj), while Algo obtains an expected revenue of C · (qτi qτj )+ 1 · (1−
qτi q
τ
j ) = 1+ (C − 1)(qiqj)τ . W.l.o.g. assume that qj ≥ qi. Thus, the ratio of the revenue obtained by Algo and π∗ij is at least:
min
qi,qj∈{0, 12 ,1},qj≥qi
1+ (C − 1)(qiqj)τ
1+ (C − 1)min(qi, qj) ≥ minqi∈{0, 12 ,1}
1+ (C − 1)q2τi
1+ (C − 1)qi
= 1+
C−1
22τ
1+ C−12
= 2C
3C − 1 . (10)
We now consider the case i = j. Again we have two subcases.
Case 2a: cii = 1. In this case π∗ii ≤ min(1, 1− qi) = 1− qi, while Algo gets a revenue of 0 · qτi + 1 · (1− qτi ) = 1− qτi .
Thus, the ratio of the revenue of Algo to π∗ii is at least
min
qi∈{0, 12 ,1}
1− qτi
1− qi = min(1, 2− 2
1−τ ) ≥ 1− 1
22τ
= 2C
3C − 1 .
Case 2b: cii = C. In this case πii ≤ 1+ (C − 1)qi. The expected revenue for Algo is 1 · (1− qτi )+ C · qτi = 1+ (C − 1)qτi ≥
1+ (C − 1)q2τi . Thus, from (10), the ratio is at least 2C3C−1 .
Thus, in all cases for every edge (i, j) ∈ E, Algo obtains an expected revenue of at least 2C3C−1 · π∗ij , as desired. 
2.3. Derandomization
Algorithm Algo(τ ) can be derandomized in a straightforward way using standard techniques. In particular, observe that
the analysis of the randomized rounding step only required pairwise independence among the random choices. One can use
a small family of pairwise independent random variables (see the survey [14] for such constructions) and exhaustively try
all the possibilities in this space.
Alternatively, one can employ themethod of conditional expectation [2,15], since the expected revenue after randomized
rounding is an easy formula to calculate (given the probabilities).
2.4. A tight integrality gap
Next, we show that Theorem 2.2 is the best one can hope from any algorithm that rounds the LP. Formally, we prove the
following.
Proposition 2.3. There exist an instance of UD2({1, C}) for which the integrality gap of the LP in Fig. 1 is at least 3C−12C .
Proof. Consider the graph with two vertices and C parallel edges—one of which has a cost of C and the rest have a cost of 1.
(This assumes that C is integral; if however C is not integral, we need to choose an appropriate number of cost 1 edges and
cost C edges such that their ratio is C .) The optimal revenue is C . However, the LP can set a price of C+12 on both the vertices
to get a revenue of C+12 from the cost C edge and a revenue of 1 from each of the cost 1 edges. Thus, the integrality gap is at
least
1 · ( C+12 )+ (C − 1) · 1
C
= 3C − 1
2C
. 
2.5. The general case
The results presented for k = 2 in the previous sections can be suitably modified to work for the general case.
The LP relaxation for general k is the natural one. For example, the constraint (4), the sum pi + pj will be replaced by∑k
j=1 pij for the hyperedge (pi1 , pi2 , . . . , pik). The ‘‘half integrality" gap result will now say that the prices are in the set
5 To see why this is true set a = 2−τ and note that we have to show that 2− 2a > 1− a2 , which is true for a ≠ 1. The latter is true as τ > 0.
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{0, (1 − 1/k)(C − 1), C − 1}. Finally, we can prove the following counterparts of Theorem 2.2 and Proposition 2.3 by
straightforward generalizations of their proofs
Theorem 2.4. For every C > 1, there an algorithm that is a (2k−1)C−k+1kC approximation for the pricing problemwith unit-demand
bidders with demand size at most k and budgets fromB = {1, C}.
Proposition 2.5. There exist an instance of UDk({1, C}) for which the integrality gap of the LP used above is at least (2k−1)C−k+1kC .
2.6. Budget range [1, C]
Another interesting restriction on the range of buyer’s budgets is to an intervalB = [1, C], which clearly generalizes the
previous doubleton case {1, C}. For this case, denoted UD2([1, C]), we obtain the following approximation.
Proposition 2.6. For every C > 1, there is a polynomial time (1 + ln C)-approximation algorithm for the unit-demand pricing
problem with k = 2 and budgets fromB = [1, C].
Proof. Consider the best single price (same price for all goods) in the range [1, C]. We claim that the revenue from this
single price is always within factor 1 + ln C of the sum of budgets of all the buyers (denote this quantity by B), and clearly
B is an upper bound on the maximum revenue. Assuming the claim, the proof is complete by observing that the best single
price can always be attained by one of the budgets appearing in the input, and thus the algorithm need only try at most n
different prices.
We conclude the proof by proving that for every ϵ > 0, there exists a pϵ price in [1, C] such that the revenue from pϵ is
at least B
1+ϵ+ ϵ ln Cln(1+ϵ)
. Note that this implies the existence of a price that attains a revenue of at least B/(1+ ln C) as the above
result holds for every ϵ > 0 (and limϵ→0 ϵ/ ln(1 + ϵ) → 1). Next, we argue the existence of pϵ . First round down all the
budgets to the largest power of (1 + ϵ). Note that this changes the total budget to B′ ≥ B/(1 + ϵ). Further, after rounding
down there arem ≤ ln1+ϵ C many distinct budget values greater than 1. For 0 ≤ i ≤ m, let there be ni budgets with values
(1+ ϵ)i. Note that B′ =∑mi=0(1+ ϵ)ini. Further, for every 0 ≤ i ≤ m, let Ri = (1+ ϵ)i∑mj=i nj be the revenue obtained by
fixing the single price to (1+ ϵ)i. It is not too hard to verify that
B′ = R0 + ϵ1+ ϵ

m−
i=1
Ri

.
Note that best possible revenue is
max
0≤i≤m
Ri.
Thus, the best possible revenue is at least the value of the optimum to the following mathematical program
min

max
0≤i≤m
yi

subject to:
y0 + ϵ1+ ϵ

m−
i=1
yi

= B′ (11)
yi ≥ 0 for every 0 ≤ i ≤ m.
We claim that the optimum above occurs when all the yi’s are equal. (If not, we could change the yi’s and yj’s with the
largest and second largest values by small enough amounts so that the constraint (11) is still satisfied but the objective value
decreases.)
Thus, the best single price obtains a revenue of at least
B′
1+ ϵm1+ϵ
≥ B
′
1+ ϵ ln1+ϵ C1+ϵ
≥ B
(1+ ϵ)

1+ ϵ ln C
(1+ϵ) ln(1+ϵ)
 = B
1+ ϵ + ϵ ln Cln 1+ϵ
,
as desired. 
One can try a natural extension of our LP-relaxation technique for {1, C} to this more general case [1, C]. However, it
turns out that the resulting LP has integrality gap 1+ ln C , and thus cannot offer improved approximation.
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max
−
(i,j)∈E
πij subject to:
∀(i, i) ∈ E πii ≤ pi (12)
∀(i, j) ∈ E, i ≠ j πij ≤ pi + pj (13)
∀(i, j) ∈ E, i ≠ j πij ≤ 2− pi − pj (14)
∀i ∈ V 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 (15)
∀(i, j) ∈ E πij ≥ 0 (16)
Fig. 2. LP relaxation for the single-minded bidders setting.
3. Single-minded buyers in commoditized markets
We now consider the pricing problem for single-minded bidders when all the bidders have the same budget, which can
be assumed w.l.o.g. to be 1. That is, we are interested in pricing schemes for the SM2({1})model. We extend our techniques
from Section 2 to get a pricing algorithm with an approximation factor of 6+
√
2
5+√2 ≈ 1.156 ( Theorem 3.2). As in the case
of single-minded bidders, our rounding procedure is tight (optimal), as we show that this LP relaxation has a matching
integrality gap.
It is not difficult to verify the LP in Fig. 2 is a relaxation for our problem SM2({1}).
As in the UD2({1, C}), we first observe that an optimal basic feasible solution to the LP relaxation is half integral.
Proposition 3.1. Every optimal basic feasible solution to the LP in Fig. 2 is half integral. More precisely, if ({p∗i }i∈V , {π∗ij }(i,j)∈E) is
such a solution then p∗i ∈ {0, 12 , 1} for all i.
The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 2.1 and is omitted (we have to analyze fewer because C = 1).
We next analyze the following randomized algorithm6.
Algorithm AlgoSM :
1. Solve the LP in Fig. 2 to obtain an optimal basic feasible solution with price variables {pi}i∈V .
2. Fix prices according to the three schemes below and pick the one that generates the maximum revenue.
(a) Assign a price pi to vertex i.
(b) If pi ≠ 1, assign a price of pi to vertex i, else assign a price of 1/2.
(c) If pi ≠ 1/2, assign a price of pi to vertex i, else assign a price of 0 with probability 1/
√
2 and a price of 1
with probability 1− 1/√2.
Theorem 3.2. AlgoSM achieves 6+
√
2
5+√2 approximation for the pricing problem with single-minded bidders, desired sets of size at
most 2, and unit budgets. That is, expected revenue of AlgoSM is at least 5+
√
2
6+√2 fraction of the optimum for SM2({1}).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary edge (i, j) ∈ E. Let π aij , π bij and π cij be the (expected) revenue that the pricing schemes in steps 2(a),
2(b) and 2(c) in AlgoSM generate for that edge. By linearity of expectation, the claimed result will follow if
max

π aij , π
b
ij , π
c
ij
 ≥ 5+√2
6+√2 · πij. (17)
To prove the above, we will show the following inequality.
1
2
· π aij +
2
6+√2 · π
b
ij +
2+√2
2(6+√2) · π
c
ij ≥
5+√2
6+√2 · πij. (18)
By Proposition 3.1, we know that pi, pj ∈ {0, 12 , 1}. A simple case analysis (for the eight possible values of (pi, pj))
proves (18). For example, consider the case when pi = 1/2 and pj = 1. In this case πij = 1/2 (due to constraint (14)
6 A minor technical modification is required: since the probability used in step 2(c) is irrational, we need to approximate it so as to work in polynomial
time.
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in the LP). It is easy to check that π aij = 0, π bij = 1 and πij = 1/
√
2 · 1+ (1− 1/√2) · 0. Thus, we have
1
2
· π aij +
2
6+√2 · π
b
ij +
2+√2
2(6+√2) · π
c
ij =
1
2
· 0+ 2
6+√2 · 1+
2+√2
2(6+√2) ·
1√
2
= 5+
√
2
6+√2 ·
1
2
= 5+
√
2
6+√2 · πij,
as desired. The calculations for the other cases (and the case of self-loops, i.e. i = j) are similar and omitted. 
The rounding procedure above is tight (optimal), as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 3.3. Let ϵ > 0 be a real number. There exist an instance of SM2({1}) for which the integrality gap of the LP in Fig. 2
is at least 6+
√
2
5+√2 − ϵ.
Proof. Consider the following graph, with all costs being 1. The graph consist of n + 1 vertices; n of the vertices form a
complete graph, with each edge having a multiplicity of an , where a = 1+
√
2. 7 The last vertex, call it w, has 2n self-loops
and an edge to each of the other n vertices (with multiplicity of 1).
The idea is the following. The LP will set the price of w to be 1 and the rest of the prices are set to 12 . Thus, the LP gets a
total revenue of
a
n
· n(n− 1)
2
+ 2n+ n
2
= a
2
(n− 1)+ 5n
2
= a+ 5
2
n− a
2
.
Below we will show that the OPT for this graph is at most (neglecting lower-order terms):
max

a+ 2
4
,
a
2
,
(a+ 1)2
4a

+ 2

· n (19)
Now for a ≥ 2, a2 ≥ a+24 . Further, (a+1)
2
4a ≥ a2 if a2 − 2a− 1 ≤ 0, which happens if a ≤ 1+
√
2. Finally, (a+1)
2
4a >
a+2
4 . Thus,
we have the following:
max

a+ 2
4
,
a
2
,
(a+ 1)2
4a

=

(a+1)2
4a if a ≤ 1+
√
2
a
2 if a ≥ 1+
√
2.
The integrality gap is maximized when a = 1+√2, which for large enough n gives a gap of at least
a+5
2
a
2 + 2
− ϵ = a+ 5
a+ 4 − ϵ =
6+√2
5+√2 − ϵ.
Next, we prove (19). It will be convenient to denote α = an .
First observe that in OPT, there is always a pricingwherew is priced at 1,8 which gives a revenue of 2n from the self-loops.
Now assume of the remaining n vertices, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0 and z ≥ 0 nodes have prices 0, 1/2 and 1 respectively. Note that
z + x+ y = n. In this case, the revenue from the non-loop edges is
x+ α

y(y− 1)
2
+ xy
2
+ xz

= x+ αy(y− 1)
2
+ αxy
2
+ αnx− αxy− αx2
= x(αn+ 1− αx)+ αy(y− x− 1)
2
. (20)
Now if y < x+ 1, then to maximize (20), it is better to set y = 0. In this case we want to maximize
x(αn+ 1− αx),
which happens at x = αn+12α giving a value of
αn+ 1
2α

αn+ 1
2

= (αn+ 1)
2
4α
= (a+ 1)
2
4a
· n. (21)
7 The multiplicity an is not an integer or even rational; formally, we approximate it using a rational number to within any desired accuracy, and then
increase all the multiplicities by the same large enough factor, which cancels out in the final ratio.
8 If w is priced at 0 then obviously, it is not optimal. If the price is 12 , then the total revenue from self-loops is n and another at most n from the edges
fromw to other nodes. If price is changed to 1, one gets a revenue of 2n from the self-loops, which is at least as much as the case when price is set to 12 .
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Now if y ≥ x + 1, then for any fixed x, it is good to set y as large as possible to maximize (20). That is, set y = n − x.
Substituting this in (20), we need to maximize
x(1+ αn)−αx2 +

αn− αx
2

(n− 1− 2x) =
= x+ αnx− αx2 + αn(n− 1)
2
− αnx− αx(n− 1)
2
+ αx2
= αn(n− 1)
2
+ x (2+ α − αn)
2
≃

a
2
+ x(2− a)
2n

· n, (22)
where in the last equation, we removed lower-order terms. Now to maximize (22), there are two cases. If a > 2, then one
should set x = 0 and if a ≤ 2, the x should be set to as large a value as possible, which is n2 (recall that we are in the case
that y ≥ x+ 1 and also that x+ y ≤ n). Thus, (22) is at most
max

a
2
,
a+ 2
4

· n. 
We note that the case of k = 2 and B = {1} is the simplest nontrivial case for the single-minded buyers model. Our
algorithm and proofs crucially use this, and while it may be possible to extend the techniques to more complex scenarios
(e.g., for larger k, or B = {1, C}), we do not see an easy extension.
4. An online 4-approximation
In this section, we consider the following online version of the UD2(·) and SM2(·) problems. Buyers are assumed to be ‘‘in
the system’’ at the beginning and the goods arrive in an online fashion. When a good arrives, any buyer who is interested
submits a bid and the seller has to price this good before the next good arrives. We assume that every buyer is interested
in at most two items and the seller knows the identity of each buyer but only finds out about the exact set of elements the
buyer is interested in after the buyer has bid for both the items he is interested in. The price that a buyer pays follows the
same rules as in UD2(·) and SM2(·)models respectively. In the graph abstraction of the UD2(·) and SM2(·), the online model
has the following interpretation. At every step, a vertex in the underlying graph arrives. Once a vertex appears, all the edges
incident on it (along with the edge weights) are revealed to the seller. But the only way the seller knows about the other
endpoint of an edge is if that vertex had arrived earlier. Under these constraints, the seller has to price every vertex as it
arrives, so as to make as much revenue as possible. For the rest of the section, we will only talk about the UD2(·)model. The
discussion holds equally well for the SM2(·)model (just replace the prices of∞ by 0).
The (offline) algorithm in [3] can be interpreted in a weaker online model in which when a vertex arrives, the seller has
the full information about the edges incident on it. That is, if the other endpoint is in the ‘‘future’’ then the seller also gets to
know about this other endpoint. We now restate the algorithm in [3] that works in this full-information scenario. Initially
with probability 1/2 decide on ‘‘left’’ or ‘‘right’’. For the ease of exposition, assume that the algorithm chose left. When a
vertex (say i) arrives, with probability 1/2 tag it as a left vertex or a right vertex (unless it is already assigned a tag). If i is a
right vertex then assign it a price∞. Otherwise look at the set of neighboring vertices of i (recall that in this weaker model
the seller knows everything about the edge incident on i). If some neighbor j has not arrived yet then assign j one of the tags
with equal probability. Let N ′(i) denote the set of neighbors of i that are tagged right. Now consider all edges between i and
N ′(i) and set the price of i to be the best fixed price given that the vertices in N ′(i) are priced at∞. By the analysis in [3],
this algorithm is 4-competitive.
We now consider the more general (true online) model, where the seller has no information about the vertices that are
yet to arrive. To clarify the difference between our online model and the weaker model we used above, consider a graph
on four vertices a, b, c, d and two edges {a, c} and {b, d}. After vertices a and b arrive (but before c and d arrive), the seller
sees (the identity of) only one endpoint of each edge, and cannot differentiate it from a scenario where the second edge is
actually {b, c}. This is in contrast to the weaker where the identities of both endpoints are revealed and thus the seller can
differentiate between these two scenarios.
For our (more general) model, we consider the following refinement of the algorithm in [3]. For any vertex i, let p∗i denote
the best fixed price for vertex i, given that all of its neighbors are priced at∞. Recall that in our online model, once a vertex
arrives, the seller knows theweights of all the incident edges. Thus, the seller can calculate the price p∗i . Given this, the online
algorithm is very simple.
Algorithm: When each vertex i arrives,
• Compute its best fixed price p∗i .• With probability 1/2 set its price pi = ∞ and with probability 1/2 set pi = p∗i .
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We have the following performance guarantee.
Theorem 4.1. For the online UD2(·)model, the algorithm above is 4-competitive in the expected sense.
Proof. For any vertex i, let R(i) denote the maximum revenue obtainable from i. That is R(i) = πii(p∗i )+
∑
(i,j)∈E πij(p
∗
i ,∞),
where πij(pi, pj) is zero if min(pi, pj) > cij and min(pi, pj) otherwise. πii(pi) is zero if pi > cii and pi otherwise9. It is not too
hard to check that
OPT ≤
−
i∈V
R(i)
=
−
(i,j)∈E

πij(p∗i ,∞)+ πij(∞, p∗j )
+ −
(i,i)∈E
πii(p∗i ), (23)
where OPT is the revenue of the optimal offline pricing. Now fix an edge (i, j) ∈ E, with i ≠ j. With probability 1/4 each,
the algorithm sets the prices to (pi, pj) = (p∗i ,∞) and (pi, pj) = (∞, p∗j ). Thus, the expected revenue that the algorithm
generates for the edge (i, j) is at least
1
4
· πij(p∗i ,∞)+
1
4
· πij(∞, p∗j ). (24)
Now consider a self-loop (i, i) ∈ E. With probability of 1/2, the algorithm set the price pi = p∗. Thus, the expected revenue
that the algorithm generates from the self-loop (i, i) is at least 12 · πii, which along with (23) and (24) and linearity of
expectation completes the proof. 
5. Conclusions
Wehave shownnear-optimal algorithms for computing profit-maximizing prices in various scenarios of restricted bidder
types. As argued earlier, these restricted scenarios may be applicable in many situations that do not require solving the
most general problem. In practice, every percent of improvement counts, requiring us to improve one (small) constant to
another. In fact, these problems fall in a familiar regime—the challenge of designing algorithmic techniques that beat the
rather naive approach of a single price for all goods. Indeed, in one example given in Section 1.1, our algorithm can increase
the guaranteed profit by 20% and decrease the ‘‘potentially lost’’ profit almost by half.
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